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Abstract: The paper examines the role of politics and power contestation in inter-group 
relations with Jos as a case analysis. Group conflict theory is adopted as a framework 
for analyzing conflict in the region. The study found that, as opposed to the assertions 
that religion and indigene/settler phenomenon are the main drivers of conflict in the 
region, struggle for political power is a stronger causative factor of conflict in the area. 
Besides, the study also found that religion and ethnic differences achieve sufficient 
strength to provoke or aggravate conflicts when politics and power struggle are 
involved. The study therefore, recommends, among others, the need to revisit the status 
of Jos North Local Government Area, implement the recommendations of various 
panels and the practice of politics of inclusiveness by political leaders. 
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Introduction 
Politics has element of conflict. This 
is because competition for  political  
power  among  individuals  and  
groups  aimed  at  controlling  and  
distributing  scarce  resources,  most  
often,  is  violence- ridden (Easton 
1965; Ball  1977; Harris  1979; 
Joshua, 2013).  The incidence of 
politics and conflict in Nigeria is 
worrisome.  Little  wonder  that  
Obasanjo (2002;50-51)  asserts  that,  
“ we  fight  and  sometimes  shed  
blood  to  achieve  and  retain  
political  power  because  for  us  in  
Nigeria,  the  political  kingdom  has  
for  too  long  been  the  gateway  to  
economic  kingdom”. It  is  
necessary  to  understand  the  fact  
that  although  conflict  in  Nigeria  
and  in  other  places  may  be  
attributed  to  lots  of  factors  such 
as religious  and  identity  
differences,  indigene/ settler  
conflict,  among  others, the  fact  
still  remains  that  politics,  is  a  
major  source  of  conflict.  As   
stated by  Dunning (2011 cited in 
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Joshua, 2013), the only  source of  
war  is  politics  because  war  is  
simply  a  continuation  of  political  
intercourse  with  the  addition  of  
other  means.  Before  there  can  be  
war,  it  is  a  matter  of  necessity  
that  there is conflict  because  
conflict  prepares  the  ground  for  
war.  Tarimos (2010)  also  argues  
that  ethnic  groups  engage  one  
another  in  contest  for  political  
power  with  each  advocating  its  
interest  in  different  ways.  He  
concluded  that  people  do  not  kill  
one  another  on  the  pretext  of  
ethnic (or  group)  differences;  they  
kill  each  other  when  these  
differences  promote  unhealthy  
competition.  The  situation  
becomes  explosive  when  the  
climate  of  social  relationship  is  
extended  to  the  political  and  
economic  spheres. 
 
Nigeria  is  today  suffused  with  
communal,  ethnic,  ethno-religious  
and  political  conflicts  that  often  
manifest  in  ferocious  and  very  
destructive   violence( Ikelegbe, 
2003; Joshua, 2013).The  situation  
has  assumed  a  dangerous  
dimension  since  the  beginning  of  
Nigeria‟s  Fourth  Republic  on  May  
29,  1999.  Imobighe (2003)  avers  
that,  within  the  first  three  years  
of  democratic  rule  in  Nigeria,  the  
country  had  witnessed  not  less  
than  forty  violent  communal  or  
ethnic  conflicts,  while  some  old  
ones  had  gained  additional  
potency.  Instances of such inter-
group conflict included  the  Zango-
Kataf  in  Kaduna  State;  Tiv-Jukun  
in  Wukari,  Taraba  State;  Ogoni- 
Andoni  in  Rivers  State;  Chamber-
Ketub  in  Taraba  State;  Itsekiri-
Ijaw/Urhobo  in  Delta  state;  Ife-
Modakeke  in  Ogun State; Bassa-
Egbura  in  Nasarawa  State  to  
mention  just  a  few. 
 
The  Federal Government  has  
increased  security  in  some  of  
these  communities,  but  
government  authorities  have  failed  
to  break  the  cycle  of  killings by 
not prosecuting  those  responsible  
for  these  crimes.  In  all,  only  few  
cases  of  perpetrators  have  been  
brought  to  book.  Over  the  years  
various  committees  and  
commissions  have  been  set  up  by  
the  Federal  Government  to  
examine  the  issues  generating  
conflicts,  but  their  reports  and  
occasional  government  white  
paper,  have  mostly  been  shelved 
(Human  Rights  Watch, 2011). 
 
The paper focuses on inter-group 
conflicts in Jos, the capital of Plateau 
State in Nigeria, which of recent, has 
become a theatre of violent conflicts.  
The  incidence  of  violent  conflicts  
in  Jos  has  become  a  repetitive 
phenomenon, especially during the 
current Fourth Republic. It  is  
against  this  background  that  this  
paper  examines conflicts in the area 
from  the  perspective  of  politics  
and  competition  for  political  
power. This paper is guided by these 
questions: is politics and competition 
for political power the fundamental 
bane of violent conflict in Jos? Are 
differences in religious inclination a 
contributory factor to conflict in Jos? 
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Are there indigene/settler dimensions 
to the conflicts? Following this 
introduction, the paper is organized 
into the following subsections; 
section one conceptualizes conflict 
and discussed the theoretical 
framework of the study. The next 
section focuses on the  geographic  
and  demographic  profile of Jos. 
section three is on the  historical  
excursion  of  the  origin  of  violent  
conflict  in  the  area  and  the  
perspectives  of  the  major  groups  
as  regards  the  causes  of  conflicts 
in  Jos. The last section, which is 
section four, constitutes conclusion 
and recommendations. 
 
Conceptual Discourse 
On Politics 
 According  to  Appadorai (1974:3),  
the  term  politics  is  derived  from  
the  Greek  word  „polis‟,  a  city- 
state.  This  definition  sees  politics  
from  the  angle  of  political  
organization  and  the  relationship  
between  individuals  and  the  state. 
Onyeke (2003),  is  of  the  view  that  
politics  is  directed  towards  and  
anchored  on  the  achievement  of  
power.  It  is  not  a  surprise  
therefore  that  politics  is  seen  as  
striving  to  share  power,  or  
influence  it‟s  distribution  either  
among  states  or  among  groups  
within  a  state (Bentham, 1974). In 
fact, 
Nnoli (1978:81) illustrates the 
intimate relationship between 
politics and power.  He  argues  that  
the  adequate  understanding  of  
power  is  crucial  for  the  
comprehension  of  politics: 
Power exists in practically 
almost all institutions.  It 
follows the same 
dynamics.  But  when  we  
talk  about  power  in  
politics,  we talk about  
state  power.  Politics  is  
an  attempt  to  be  in  the  
highest  position  possible  
so  as  to  wield  state  
power.  All  other  forms  
of  power  yield  to  it  and  
are,  or  can  be  controlled  
by  it.  This explains its 
attractiveness.  Those who  
are  wealthy  and  thus  
expected  to  be  contented  
must  still  strive  for  
control  of  state  power,  
because  without  this  
control,  their  wealth  may  
not  be  secured  as  state  
power  could  be  used  to  
take  their  wealth  away. 
It  can  be deduced  from  the  above  
definitions that  state  power  
guarantees  access  to  almost  
everything  in  life.  The  volatility  
usually  generated  by  political  
activities  in  comparison  with  
economic,  social  and  cultural  
activities  is  an  eloquent  testimony  
of  the  fact  that,  the  usefulness  of  
state  power  to  groups  and  
individuals  is  widely  recognized.  
Thus,  people  scheme,  jostle  and  
sometimes  kill  in  a  manner  that  is  
not  seen  in  the  other  spheres  of  
life  in  other  to  gain  political  
power ( Nnoli,  1986).   
Having  examined  some  of  the  
definitions  of  politics  and  the  
linkage  between  politics  and  
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power,  it  is  germane  to  come  out  
with  a  working  definition  of  
politics  in  the  light  of  the  
discussion. Politics  in  the  context  
of  this  paper  is seen in a  pejorative 
sense  which  denote  the  use  of  
blackmails,  double-dealing,  
manipulation,  violence,  
assassination fanning the embers of 
sentiment  and  other  forms  of  
immoral  means  to  acquire, retain, 
and use  political  power  for  selfish  
purposes. 
 
On Conflict  
Opinions are divided as regard the 
meaning of conflict. Audu (2010) 
argues that conflict is a very fluid 
and ambiguous term, usually with 
negative connotation. Ross (1993:14) 
notes that conflict “occurs when 
parties disagree about the 
distribution of material or symbolic 
resources and act because of the 
incompatibility of goals or a 
perceived divergence of interest”. 
Horowitz (1985:101) sees conflict as 
a “struggle in which the aim is to get 
objective and simultaneously 
neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals”. 
Daugherty and Falztgraff (cited in 
Omotosho, 2004), view conflict as a 
situation in which one identifiable 
group of human beings which could 
be tribal, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
religious, socio-economic, political 
or otherwise is in a state of conscious 
opposition to one or more other 
identifiable human groups. This 
could be because those groups are 
pursuing what appears to be 
incompatible goals. 
The various definitions above 
portray conflict in a negative term, 
however, it must be mentioned that 
politics may not necessarily be evil. 
As scholars like Nwolise (2004) and 
Pruitt (2004) argue, conflict may 
even bring about development. It is 
when conflict is not well-managed 
and allowed to snowball to violent 
conflagration that it becomes evil. 
In situating this work within a 
theoretical construct, the study 
adopts group conflict theory.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Group Conflict Theory  
Theorists that subscribe to this 
theoretical construct view conflict as 
a product of a struggle for power 
among various groups within a 
society. Scholars like Esses and 
Jackson (2008) argue that group 
conflict theory apart from dealing 
with the origins and functions of 
inter-group conflict, it tends to place 
particular emphasis on the role of 
either socially prevalent ideologies 
or situational factors which work 
together to create and exacerbate 
perceptions of inter-group 
competition and tension. The 
assumption of this model is that, 
political violence for instance is as a 
result of conflict between different 
actors within a given political 
enclave. In that circumstance, all 
politics is inherent in conflict 
between political actors representing 
their various groups. Hewstone et al 
(2008) contend that groups in 
proximity are often groups in 
conflict. Neighbouring groups often 
pose potential threats to social 
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identity, to numerical superiority, to 
locally held power, even to the 
existence of one‟s own group. Even 
in conflicts that appear to be ethnic 
(such as Hutus-Tutsi conflict in 
Rwanda and Burundi) competition 
for power and resources may be as 
important as ethnic differences. 
 
Similarly, there is a strand of group 
theory which emphasizes sub-
cultural division. The main argument 
of this strand is that political 
instability is a function of cultural 
pluralism of heterogeneous nations 
in which the focal point of political 
identification and socialization is 
based on sub-national communities 
with different cultures and history 
(Powel 1992). This position has been 
corroborated by Morrison and 
Stephenson (1972) that cultural 
pluralism increases the possibility of 
conflict between members of 
communal groups. This is similar to 
power approach position that “racial 
and ethnic groups compete for 
power, prestige and privilege and 
that, hostilities will arise and 
increase with intensity of 
competition” (Giles and Evans, 
1986:471 cited in Joshua, 2013). 
 
The position above lends credence to 
the assertion that elite, in the course 
of contending for power, often 
manipulate social divisions and blow 
them out of proportion with threat, 
fear, hate, discord, propaganda, 
thereby, making politics to be crisis 
laden. Thus, elite create 
opportunities with issues and crises 
to advance their interests and goals. 
Conciliation is difficult when rival 
leaders demonize their adversaries as 
opponents who can never be trusted 
and must therefore be defeated, 
dominated or ethnically cleansed 
(Obserschall, 2010). Political elite 
seems to occupy the center stage of 
political activities and power 
contestation with implication for 
inter-group conflict because 
according to Isumonah (1997),  the 
initiative for ethnic mobilization 
originates from the elite; ethnic 
nationalist movements are led by the 
elite; and ethnic mobilization is 
primarily, if not totally, for the 
benefits of the elites. 
The next segment probes the 
background of conflicts in Jos. 
 
Background to Jos Conflict  
Plateau state is located in the Middle 
Belt of Nigeria. It is important to 
state that the idea of Middle Belt 
came about as a result of the nature 
of politics in Nigeria‟s First Republic 
(1960-1966) (some minor ethnic 
groups complained of 
marginalization by the major ethnic 
group, hence the creation of the 
Middle Belt in the North to assuage 
the fear of minorities in the North) 
(Best, 2008).  Jos is the capital of 
plateau state and is located in the 
north east zone of the country. It is 
situated at 9:56 N 8.53 E, high on the 
Jos Plateau. It has a population of 
510, 000, making it the 10
th
 largest 
city in Nigeria (Onuoha, et al, 2010). 
 
The violent conflicts in Jos are 
between the indigenes –Berom, 
Anaguta and Afizere ethnic groups 
and the Hausa/Fulani that are 
classified as settlers. Most authors 
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often viewed violent conflicts in Jos 
from indigenes/settlers and religious 
perspectives (Omotola, 2006 cited in 
Para-Malam, 2011; Best, 2008, 
Kwaja, 2008, Adi, 2011). However, 
this paper examined intergroup 
conflicts in Jos from political 
perspective. Before incessant violent 
conflicts in Jos, the entire Plateau 
State lived to its name- Home of 
Peace and Tourism but of recent has 
become a theatre of conflict 
(Onuoha, et al 2010).Violent 
conflicts in Jos seems to have started 
in the 1990‟s specifically from 1994 
and has continued till date. 
 
In addition, the city has witnessed a 
lot of suicide bombing which is 
believed to have been orchestrated 
by the Boko Haram group (ICG, 
2012). It has been observed that 
since 2001, violence in Jos has 
become more frequent and deadlier. 
Between 1999 and 2001, over 80 
episodes of violent conflicts between 
the indigenes (Boom, Anaguta and 
Afizere) and the Hausa/Fulani 
settlers were recorded. However, 
there seems to be an increase and 
intensity in violent conflicts in the 
area since 2004 although no exact 
figures are available. Not less than 
4,000 people have died in violent 
conflicts in the area in the past 
eleven years (ICG, 2012). Non –
indigenous  communities alone 
claimed  they have  lost as detailed 
below; south-west (Yoruba), number 
killed 630, estimate of material 
losses N450 billion; south-east 
(Igbo) number killed 604, estimate of 
material losses N410 billion and 
south –south claimed that no fewer  
than 430 of their indigenes have been 
killed with N110 billion material 
losses. A total of 1, 664 people  from 
the aforementioned non-indigenes 
have been killed, while property 
worth  a total of 970 billion have 
been destroyed since 1994 
(Suleiman, 2011). The figures above 
did not include the indigenes and 
Hausa/Fulani group that have died in 
the crises. 
 
Some  of the remote causes of 
violent conflicts  in Jos  as listed by 
Suleiman (2011) hinges on  the claim 
of the ownership of Jos; indigeneship 
of Jos; effort at Islamization of the 
area; delimitation of electoral  wards; 
blockage of roads during worship; 
indiscriminate use of speakers; 
Fulani trespassing on farmlands; 
alleged discrimination against 
Muslims by government; and non-
implementation of previous reports. 
The different perspectives to 
conflicts in Jos are depicted in the 
next section. 
 
Conflict Perspectives and Causes 
of Conflict in Jos 
I t is important  to understand that 
perception is a  major source  of  
conflicts which  is why  in analyzing 
conflict, it is necessary to present  
the different  perspectives of parties 
in conflict so as to proffer valid  
solutions. This is because this 
understanding will provide 
information on how parties view 
conflict. According to Best (2007), 
the various perspectives of violent 
conflict in Jos include: 
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The Hausa/Fulani Perspectives 
The Fulani did not lay claim to the 
ownership of Jos and are never 
interested in the political issues that 
generated conflict in Jos. They 
claimed that attacks on them by the 
so-called indigenes are borne out of 
envy as a result of cows they own 
and because they are Muslims like 
the Hausa that is why they are often 
treated like the Hausas by the 
indigenes. However, the Hausa 
version has it that the land belong to 
the Hausa/Fulani because they 
believe that they founded Jos when it 
was a virgin land and developed it 
into a modern town. They also 
believe  they outnumbered  any other 
groups  in the city up to 1950; that 
they ruled the town  traditionally, 
and produced  eleven  Hausa/Fulani  
rulers  up till 1947 after  which  they 
were  maneuvered out of the stool. 
They also buttressed their claims by 
the presence of Alkali courts which 
was to service the needs of the 
Hausa/Fulani population in Jos till 
1950‟s. In addition,  the  naming  of 
major streets  and areas  in Jos with 
Hausa name such as (Abba Na 
Shehu, Garba Daho, Sarkin Arab, 
Gangare, etc) and their political  
contributions, having  been elected  
and appointed  to represent Jos at 
different positions of responsibility, 
dating back  to the  colonial times, 
among others, authenticate the fact 
that the land belongs to the 
Hausa/Fulani group. 
 
 
 
 
 
Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere 
Perspectives 
The three groups mentioned above 
claimed that Jos belong to them and 
that the name Jos is derived from 
their native languages. For example 
the Berom claimed that Jos is 
derived from Berom traditional name 
„Jot‟ meaning water spring which 
was corrupted by strangers like 
Europeans and Hausa/ Fulani and 
changed to Jos. The Afizere and 
Anaguta also have their own version 
of the derivative of Jos from their 
own native names. However the tree 
ethnic groups classified as indigenes 
argued that the Hausa/ Fulani group 
were brought into Jos by the colonial 
overlords as a result of the high 
demand for tin in the tin industry in 
Jos especially during the Second 
World War and that they have been 
living in the area for quite a long 
time. 
 
They debunked the claim by the 
Hausas to have ruled Jos, and 
maintained that such acclaimed 
rulers were only appointed as leaders 
over the Hausa settlements in the tin 
mines and had nothing to do with 
other indigenes. They also added 
that, since Hausa/Fulani did not 
succeed in conquering the Jos area in 
any pre- colonial battle, or after then 
during the popular Jihad war, their 
argument of having rule Jos in the 
past is baseless. The indigenes also 
claimed that they have their own 
names for different locations in Jos. 
They argued that by 1960 the Hausa 
allegedly renamed most parts of the 
city in Hausa names, which they now 
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use as evidence that they founded the 
city. The indigenes version as regard 
ownership of Jos went further that 
during the creation of Jos North 
Local Government in 1991, they (the 
indigenes) were initially passive as 
they did not understand the impact of 
the local government creation but 
they had hoped it was for 
development. 
 
Having examined the various 
versions of indigenes/settlers claims 
on the ownership of Jos, it is 
necessary to state that the continuous 
settlers/ indigenes conflict in Jos is a 
reflections of the long standing sense 
of grievance between a small 
Muslim community who felt that 
they were treated as second class 
citizens by the indigenes. The 
Hausa/Fulani grievance seems to be 
predicated on lack of access to power 
and resources despite their claim of 
being the majority in the biggest of 
the local government area, Jos North 
(ICG, 2012).  The next segment 
explored the political dimension of 
intergroup conflicts in Jos. 
 
Politics and Power in Inter-Group 
Conflicts in Jos 
The late former governor of Plateau 
State Solomon Lar postulated that 
the problem in Jos is not religion but 
politics (Suleiman, 2011). The 
problem of Jos is traceable to the 
balkanization of the former Jos local 
government in 1991 into Jos North 
and Jos South Local Government 
Councils by the General Ibrahim 
Babangida military junta (Suleiman, 
2011). This exercise (balkanization 
of Jos Local Government Area into 
two) appears a watershed in the 
politics and governance of the city of 
Jos.The I C G (2012) notes that the 
balkanization of the former Jos Local 
Government Area into Jos North and 
South were done at the insistence of 
the Hausa and Fulani community in 
Jos (the head of the government in 
power then being from Hausa 
extraction yielded to this demand by 
dividing the existing Jos Local 
Government Area into Jos North and 
South). It should be noted that the 
Hausa/Fulani are concentrated in Jos 
North thus the creation of Jos North 
Local Government Area  altered the 
political equation of the ancient city-
Jos in favour of the Hausa/Fulani. 
The implication of the above can 
been seen in two ways: it changed 
the dominant position of the 
indigenes in the Jos North as they 
were no longer the most populous in 
the Jos North and they also lost 
control over the Palace of their 
paramount leader, the Gbong Gwom, 
which was in the heart of Jos city. 
Added to this is the fact that, it gave 
the settlers (Hausa/Fulani) 
opportunity for group expressions 
which they had always canvassed 
for. 
 
In short, the creation of Jos North 
Local Government Area resulted in 
frosty or strain relations between the 
indigenes and settlers. This situation 
was exacerbated with the election of 
Samaila Mohammed, a Hausa/Fulani 
settler as the first elected Chairman 
of the Jos North Local Government 
Council. Although he issued 
certificate of indigeneship to both 
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Hausa/Fulani and the host 
community, he however, appointed 
members of his community 
(Hausa/Fulani) into sensitive 
positions in the council, a 
development frown at by the 
indigenes (ICG, 2012). 
 
Some years later, the strained 
relationship between Hausa/ Fulani 
settlers and the indigenes 
(Berom/Anaguta/Afizere) 
degenerated into violent 
conflagration when Alhaji Aminu 
Mato another Hausa- Fulani was 
appointed the Chairman of Jos North 
Local Government Area by the then 
state Military Governor, Col. 
Mohammed Mana (Onuoha et al, 
2010). The appointment of Aminu  
Mato by Col. Mohammed as the 
Chairman of Jos North Local 
Government Council was interpreted 
by the indigenes as an imposition of 
a settler on them by the government 
of the day especially with the fact 
that Col. Mohammed Mana is of the 
same ethnic group with Aminu Mato. 
In fact, between 1991 and May 29, 
1999 when the military quit the 
political arena and handed over 
political power to civilian 
government, the Military 
Governors/Administrators in the 
state (Plateau State) are all Hausas 
ditto the Caretaker Chairmen of Jos 
North  (ICG,  2012). The return of 
democratic rule in Nigeria however, 
changed this power structure. When 
election was conducted into the 
governorship position of Plateau 
State in 1999, Joshua Dariye an 
indigene of the state emerged as a 
winner. He also recontested in the 
2003 election and won again. The 
state was firmly under the control of 
an indigene. It obviously resulted in 
the concentration of power and 
resources in his hand which he could 
use to shape state policy and 
influence who holds local office. He 
was sacked during the introduction 
of emergency rule in Plateau State 
and was subsequently impeached by 
the State House of Assembly (all 
between 2004 to November 2006), 
but was later reinstated by the verdict 
of the Supreme Court in April 2007 
(Human Right Watch, 2011). 
 
Dariye, during his tenure, promised 
to include the Hausa/Fulani in the 
political affairs of the state but was 
accused to have denied the 
Hausa/Fulani citizenship rights and 
claims and also attempted to 
indigenize all major positions. 
However, he allowed settler 
representatives to be members of Jos 
North Council Caretaker Committee 
as he refused to conduct local 
government elections and rather 
preferred to appoint sole 
administrators to run the councils. 
Added to the above is the claim by 
the Hausa-Fulani in Jos that since 
1999, only two of them have enjoyed 
been voted into the Plateau House of 
Assembly and the National 
Assembly. The Hausa/Fulani heaped 
the blame on the Plateau State 
Independent Electoral Commission 
(PLASIEC) accusing it of 
manipulation, and the incumbent 
using his power to rig elections. This 
perceived scenario of the 
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Hausa/Fulani aggravated the sense of 
alienation which they often vent in 
form of religious crises (I C G, 
2012). In the opinion of Onuoha et al 
(2010), religious undertone of the 
conflict could be partly attributed to 
the adoption of Sharia (Islamic legal 
code) by most states in the North. 
Thus, Hausa/Fulani that seems to 
constitute the majority in Jos North 
advocated for it in the area, hence, 
the violence that attended this 
demand. 
 
After the expiration of Dariye‟s 
tenures, Jonah Jang the incumbent 
was elected in 2007 and 2011. He 
belongs to a very small sub- ethnic 
group, within the bigger Berom 
community. Jang‟s tenures have 
been very tempestuous as the spate 
of violence since he started as the 
governor of Plateau State has 
increased. On 28 November 2008, 
there was violence in Jos. This was 
linked to local government politics 
(Onuoha et al, 2010). The violence 
was a fallout of the local government 
election in Jos North. What triggered 
the conflict was the allegation by the 
Hausa/Fulani that the Jang 
administration has planned to rig 
election so as to pave way for 
electoral victory of his cousin a 
Berom, who contested on the 
platform of the People Democratic 
Party (PDP)   (Suleiman, 2011). 
Violence also broke out over the 
results of an election on the ground 
that the election was won by the 
candidate of the PDP who is a 
Christian. The riot left in its wake 
over 1000 dead and property 
(houses, mosques, churches and cars) 
worth millions of naira damaged. 
 
On Sunday 17, January 2010 a 
bloody violence broke out in Jos 
again, more than 400 people were 
killed in this round of violence. It 
was believed to be as a result of 
dispute between Christians and 
Muslims in Nasarawa Gwom area of 
the city. It seems to be a reprisal 
attack for the deficiencies some 
parties suffered during 2008 
bloodbath. On 7
th
 march, 2010, 
another violent conflict rocked the 
city. The attack was carried out by 
hundreds of Fulani herdsmen who 
invaded three Christian villages of 
DogoNahawa, Ratsat ad Zot at 
midnight. About 500 persons mostly 
women, children and elderly people 
were victims. The violence was 
interpreted as a reprisal attack led by 
Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups over the 
killings of mostly Muslims in 
January 2010 riot (Onuoha et al, 
2010). 
 
The crisis in Jos grew worse under 
Jang because he seems to give 
sections of the public impression that 
he has personal and ethnic agenda. 
He was quoted to have said that the 
indigenes should stop selling land to 
settlers and also relocated the palace 
of Gbong Gwom from Jos North to 
Jos South, where the indigenes have 
numerical advantage. Appointment 
into major political offices and 
location of infrastructures facilities 
appears to be tilted towards this 
communal logic (i.e favouring the 
indigenes) (ICG, 2012). 
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The crisis in Jos has been 
compounded by the involvement of 
suicide bombers. The city witnessed 
three suicide bombings between 
December 2011 and March 2012 
suspected to have been orchestrated 
by members of Boko Haram. There 
were further attacks in April and 
June 2012 (ICG, 2012). The attack 
either by Fulani herdsmen and Boko 
Haram of recent on Jos has been 
intermittent. 
 
From the above analysis, it can be 
deduced that politics and competition 
for political power is the major 
source of conflicts in Jos, although 
there are ethnic and religious 
undertone to conflicts in the area. 
The indigene/settler phenomenon 
and religions differences are not 
major issues in Jos if there are no 
political dimensions to them. The 
reason violent conflicts in Jos seem 
to be ethnic or identity based is 
because ethnic identity serves as the 
leeway to economic and political 
resources from which non-indigenes 
are excluded. In addition, as stated 
before, because the Hausa-Fulani 
groups are mostly Muslims and the 
Berom, Anaguta and Afizere 
(indigenes) are predominantly 
Christians, it often made political 
violence to be expressed in religious 
terms. 
 
Our finding is in line with the current 
trend of thought as reflected by 
Kaigama (2012:19) in his analysis on 
a decade of interventions in the 
Plateau State crises that: 
 …May I state that all the 
past crises in the state had 
underlying political 
motivations. They only 
appear on the surface to be 
ethnic or religious but they 
had serious political 
undertones. Very often, they 
started off as political 
struggles and later assumed 
other dimensions. Peace in 
Plateau state largely depends 
on the sincerity of 
politicians to work with the 
well-being of our people. 
 
In the same vein, Sha (2005) and 
Para-Malam, (2011) posit that 
conflict among groups in Jos is 
traceable to political appointment. 
The Sultan of Sokoto, in his 
Ramadan speech in August 
2011commented on the crisis that: 
Politicians in and out of power 
must resist the temptation of 
using religion as a means of 
gaining acceptability…. If you 
are playing politics you should 
not involve religion. Avoid the 
temptation. That easily leads 
to problems and violence most 
of the time… (Paden, 2012).  
The above position validate the fact 
that politics and competition for 
political power is central to Jos 
crises. The section below examined 
the various efforts at managing inter-
group conflicts in Jos.  
 
Characteristically in its manner, the 
Federal Government has deployed 
Special Task Force (STF) a joint 
police-military operation to Jos after 
the 2001 crisis. The Task Force was 
accused of taken side. They were 
accused of supporting the Hausa-
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Fulani groups, particularly the Fulani 
herdsmen in attacking villages 
dominated by the indigenes. This is 
because Fulani herdsmen attacks 
were said to have taken place very 
close to where the Task Force were 
stationed without any arrest being 
made. They were equally alleged to 
have exchanged their guns for 
money and other luxury things. 
 
In addition, the government set up 
several commissions of inquiries to 
probe the crisis. Some of the 
commissions of inquiries include the 
Justice Aribiton Fiberesima Panel, 
which probed the crisis of 1994, the 
Justice Niki Tobi‟s Panel, which 
investigated the crisis of 2001. There 
was also the Peace Conference of 
2006; called Plateau Resolve, the 
Emmanuel Abisoye Panel, the Bola 
Ajibola Commission of inquiry and 
an 18 member Presidential Advisory 
Committee headed by the late 
Solomon Lar a statesman and former 
civilian governor of the state. 
 
Notable of these commissions that 
made far reaching recommendations 
towards resolving the violent 
conflicts in Jos are the Niki Tobi, 
Bola Ajibola and the Solomon Lar 
Commissions. There 
recommendations covered land 
ownership, security, politics and 
reconciliation, religious, Jos local 
government status, treatment of 
suspects and compensation to 
victims of violent conflict in Jos. 
 
All the reports of the various panels 
ascribed ownership of Jos to the 
native tribes of Afrizere, Anaguta 
and Berom but the Hausa 
Communities challenged it in court. 
All the commissions of inquiry also 
recommended the restructuring of 
the Jos North local government to 
correct perceived imbalance, among 
others for detail see (Sha, 2005; 
Onuoha et al, 2010; Suleiman, 2011; 
ICG, 2012; The News, 2012). 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
From the foregoing discourse, it can 
be concluded that politics is a major 
issue generating conflict in the city 
of Jos, although its manifestations 
seem to take on religious and 
indigene/settler colouration. 
However, in order to mitigate the 
issues resulting in, reduce, and if 
possible, eliminate the conflicts in 
Jos, the following recommendations 
are of necessity: 
 Politics should be used to 
unite disparate groups, rather 
than used to amplify group 
differences for political gains. 
 Privileges attached to 
political offices should be 
reduced to make them less 
attractive. Since conflict in 
the area revolves mainly 
around competition for 
political power, whosoever 
comes to power should see 
the entire area as his/her 
constituency and treat all the 
people as his own. 
 There is need to revisit the 
status of the Jos North Local 
Government Council to make 
it more representative and 
reflect the wishes of all the 
communities in a way that 
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 will bring about unity and a 
sense of belongingness. 
 Government should 
implement the 
recommendations of the 
various panels especially 
those that will promote 
inclusiveness, equity and 
justice.  
 Investigation into the degree 
of culpability of persons 
involved in violence and 
killings in Jos should be 
conducted and perpetrators 
punished accordingly.  
 National Assembly should 
revisit the constitutional 
clause bordering on the vest 
issue of indigene provision in 
the 1999 constitution with the 
aim of emphasizing common 
citizenship based on 
residency.  
 
Finally, there is need to build the 
culture of peace and tolerance in 
inter-group interaction. The security 
forces charged with the 
responsibility of quelling violence in 
Jos should be well composed and not 
deployed based on ethnic or religious 
considerations, so as not to give 
room for ethnic sentiment in the 
discharge of their duties. 
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